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DICKINSON LAW' REVIEW
In conclusion the following generalizations may be made:
I. Ignorance of the common law or a statute is never a defense.
II. A mistake of law is not a defense, except:
A. When the mistake was due to a reliance on a decision of the high-
est court in the state.
B. When the law upon the subject is confusing or obscure, and capable
of more than one reasonable interpretation.
C. When the mistake negatives the specific intent which is an essen-
tial element of the crime.
Richard E. Kohler
THE FARMER AND THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS
In amending the statutory definition of a farmer under the Bankruptcy Act,
the 74th Congress progressed with one foot and regressed with the other. It inci-
dentally raked anew the coals of an old controversy centering around the question,
Who is a farmer?
Our present Bankruptcy Act,' basically created in 1898 and frequently
amended since then,2 exempts farmers from involuntary bankruptcys It is not
the writer's purpose to question the wisdom of extending to the farmer the bene-
fitti of voluntary bankruptcy, while withholding froim his creditors the comple-
mentary assistance of involuntary proceedings.4 The humanitarian aspects of our
'Act of July 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 544, 11 U. S. C. A. 1-303.
2
Acts of Feb. 15, 1903; June 15, 1906; June 25, 1910; Mar. 2, 1917; Jan. 7, 1922; May 27,
1926; Feb. 11, 1932; Mar. 3, 1933; May 24, 1934; June 7, 1934; June 18, 1934; June 28, 1934;
May 15, 1935; Aug. 28, 1935.
SBankruptcy Act, section 4b, as amended May 15, 1935, c. 114, sec. 1, 49 Stat. 246; 11 U. S. C. A.
2 2b. Wage-earners (individuals who work for wages, salary, or hire, at a rate of compensation
not exceeding $1500 per year) and the following corporations are also immune from involuntary
bankruptcy: municipalities, railroads, insurance companies, banks, and building and loan associations.
4That the courts are not in agreement as to the reason for the exception is indicated by the two
following quotations-the one arbitrarily certain, the other hesitatingly general:
"The intent of Congress to protect men in agriculture, who might fall behind from the failure
of crops tor one or two seasons, has always been recognized as the basis for this provision in the
statute." In re Doroski (D. C.), 271 Fed. 8, at p. 9 (1921).
"it may be safely assumed that Congress had no wish to facilitate preferences among a farmer's
banking or mercantile creditors. There were in its judgment, however, reasons which in the over-
whelming majority of cases made it inexpedient that farmers be subject to the possibility of involuntary
bankruptcy, although, of course, there would be instances in which the denial to creditors of the right
to institute bankruptcy proceedings against a farmer would work grave injustice to them and be of
11o benetit to him." In re Disney (D. C.), 219 Fed. 294, at 297 (1915).
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bankruptcy law show forth favorably when contrasted with the practice which
existed in ancient Babylonia, where the defaulting debtor was sold into slavery.5
And we may pride ourselves that creditors are no longer entitled to the dubious
privilege of cutting an insolvent's body into pieces and sharing it proportionately.
as was allegedly the case in Rome under the law of the Twelve Tables. 6 Even a
cursory review of the barbaric treatment once undergone by persons unabie to
meet their obligations prompts us not to be overly critical of our own system. Yet
for centuries the trend of bankruptcy legislation has been in the direction of
enlarging the field of those who may become bankrupts. Thus, while the earliest
statute on bankruptcy in this country dealt exclusively with involuntary proceedings
against merchants, 7 the second Bankruptcy Act added as voluntary bankrupts all
persons "owing debts", 8 and the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 embraced all persons,
irrespective of occupation, owing debts exceeding $300, whether such persons
voluntarily sought the relief or were the objects of involuntary petitions.9 There-
fore, it was reversal of the previous tendency when the Act of 1898 excepted from
involuntary proceedings wage-earners and persons "engaged chiefly in farming
or the tillage of the soil." In England, the source of our own bankruptcy system, 10
any debtor may be an involuntary bankrupt, regardless of his vocational pursuits.1
But whatever may have been the purpose of the framers of the Act of 1898
in exempting from involuntary proceedings all natural persons "engaged chiefly
in farming or the tillage of the soil", it must be conceded that the wording of the
exemption gave rise to a variety of interpretations among the courts. Although
it was uniformly agreed that the facts of each case should determine whether a
given debtor fell with the exempt class,12 and although it was also admitted that
if one was actually engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil, the pres-
ence of other interests became immaterial,' 3 still, in the application of these general-
ities, the courts often rendered decisions disconcertingly contradictory.
5Code of Hammurabi, secs. 115-11.
62 BI. Comm., ch. 31, p. 472.
7Act of April 4, 1800, sec. 1, 2 Stat. 19. Repealed by the Act of Dec. 19, 1803, 2 Stat. 248.
8Act of Aug. 19, 1841, sec. 1, 58 Stat. 440. Repealed by the Act of Mar. 3, 1843, 5 Stat. 614.
9Act of Mar. 2, 1867, secs. 11 & 39, 14 Stat. 517. Repealed by the Act of June 7, 1878. 20
Stat. 99.
2OSextun v. Dreyfuss, 219 U. S. 339 (1910).
liAct of 4 & 5 George V (1914), c. 59, sec. 1.
12 1n re Mackey (D. C.), 110 Fed. 355 (1901) ; In re Glick (C. C. A.), 26 F. (2d) 398, at 400.
Cf. also In re Storey (D. C.), 9 F. Supp. 858 (1934).
l8 Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co. v. Shelhorse (C. C. A.), 228 Fed. 493 (1915).
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FARMING AND THE TILLAGE OF THE SOIL
Some judges took the position that "farming" and "the tillage of the soil"
were synonymous terms. 14 Others decided that the two expressions indicated
distinct occupations.' 5 In order to be consistent, those adopting the former view
were obliged to hold that the raising of live stock was not farming.'6 Needless
to say, the opposite opinion was maintained with equal insistence by courts ad-
hering to the idea that farming included more than the tillage of the soil."1
CHIEF OCCUPATION
The adverb "chiefly", as used in the series of words, "engaged chiefly in farm-
ing or the tillage of the soil", provided even more embarrassment. Granting
that each case was to be decided by the court'" on its own facts, this was little
comfort to a judge or referee when confronted with the problem of selecting
determinative factors and ascribing to each its appropriate weight under the cir-
cumstances. Not just some, but all of the respondent's activities had to be taken
into consideration.19 It was not a question of how much time a man put in farm-
ing; that was only one element. The question of his interests, and his activities,
and the things that engaged his attention, made the distinction. 20 Accordingly,
1 4 "The word 'farmer' and the term 'tillage of the soil' are synonymous." In re Brown (D. C.),
284 Fed. 899, at 900 (1922). "The word 'farming' and the words 'tillage of the soil' mean the
same thing." Hart-Parr Co. v. Barkley (C. C. A.), 231 Fed. 913 (1916).
See also In re Spengler (D. C.), 238 Fed. 568 (1922).
"5"Tillage of the soil does not stand as a statutory definition of farming. Tillage is a part
of farming, but is not coextensive with the whole of farming." In re Dwyer (C. C. A.). 184 Fed.
SHo (1911). Cf. also In re Thompson (D. C.), 102 Fed. 287 (1900), where it was stated that one
might be a farmer and yet not a tiller of the soil. In Bank of Dearborn v. Matney (D. C.), 132
Fed. 75 (1904), the court took what may be called a middle ground, when it denied that the terms
were synonymous but said that they were "more or less closely allied." In Wulbern v. Drake
(C. C. A.), 120 Fed. 493 (1903), aff'g. In re Drake (D. C.), 114 Fed. 229 (1902), the court added
no light to the subject when it defined farming as the business of cultivating land or employing it
for purposes of husbandry."
16 1n re Thompson (D. C.), 102 Fed. 287 (1900) ; In re Brown (D. C.), 132 Fed. 706 (1904);
In re Stubbs (D. C.), 281 Fed. 568 (1922). See also Bank of Dearborn v. Matney (D. C.), 132 Fed.
75 (1904) ; In re Brown (C. C. A.), 253 Fed. 35 (1918), afj'g 251 Fed. 365 (1918), Likewise
it was observed by way of dictum that one engaged chiefly in operating a dairy farm was not exempt
from involuntary bankruptcy. Gregg v. Mitchell (C. C. A.), 166 Fed. 725 (1909).
1ln re Dwyer (C. C. A.), 184 Fed. 880 (1911); In re Tyler (D. C.), 284 Fed. 152 (1922);
Semble, In re Sutter (D. C.), 270 Fed. 248 (1920).
s11n bankruptcy procedure right to a jury trial on the issue of the defendant's occupation does
not exist as a personal prerogative. Moore v. Yampa Mercantile Co. (C. C. A.), 287 Fed. 629 (1923).
For the cases where a jury trial may be demanded, see Bankruptcy Act, sec. 19a, 11 U. S. C. A. 42a.
It the question of the respondent's occupation is submitted to a jury, the verdict is advisory only.
Moore v. Yampa Mercantile Co., supra.
191n re Brown (C. C. A.), 253 Fed. 357 (1918), aff'g 251 Fed. 365 (1918).
201a re Spengler (D. C.), 238 Fed. 862 (1916).
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the fact that one devoted the greater part of his energy and capital to a given
pursuit did not control the case entirely.21 Proof that most of an insolvent's debts
sprang from enterprises unconnected with agriculture tended to refute any con-
tention that he was principally engaged in farming,22 but such proof, standing
alone, did not settle the question.2 3 The comparative amount of revenue received
in different fields of endeavor represented still another factor to be considered.24
Where the equities of a case were particularly well balanced the court truly had
a difficult task in arriving at a fair conclusion. Even though a few courts tried
gallantly to come to the rescue with an all-inclusive definition of "chief business",
the futility of these attempts was manifest. We may well imagine with what long-
ing the federal courts looked to the Canadian Bankruptcy Act, which removes all
doubt on this point by exempting persons engaged solely in farming or the tillage
of the soil.26
A review of the decisions may give the reader a better idea of some of the
situations that arose in this connection. Where a man tilled over thirty-five acres
of land, rented twenty-five acres more to other farmers, and received compensation
for seventy-five acres of pasturage, but also maintained a picnic grounds, it was
held that he was not engaged chiefly in farming.2 7 One who spent most of his
time in farming, though devoting some attention to the practice of law, was ex-
empt from involuntary bankruptcy.2 8 The same result was reached with refer-
ence to a person chiefly engaged in farming who was also a private banker,29 or
a bank cashier,3 0 or the operator of a grist mill,a1 or who conducted a country
2 1
1n re Mackey (D. C.), 110 Fed. 355 (1901).
221n re Brown (D. C.), 284 Fed. 899 (1912); In re Maclem (D. C.), 22 F. (2d) 426 (1927).
2 8Powers v. Silberman (C. C. A.), 3 F. (2d) 802 (1925).
24 1nstances of this are frequent. See, for cxample, In re Hoy (D. C.), 137 Fed. 175 (1905);
Rise v. Bordner (D. C.), 140 Fed. 566 (1905); Am. Agr. Chem. Co. v. Brinkley (C. C. A.), 194
Fed. 411 (1912).
2 5 0ne's chief occupation or business is "that which is of principal concern to him, of some
permanency in its nature, and on which he chiefly relies for his livelihood or as a means of acquiring
wealth, great or small." In re Mackey (D. C.), 110 Fed. 335 (1901). See also Bank of Dearborn
v. Matney (D. C.), 132 Fed. 75 (1904).
One's chief business is "the business to which he devotes more largely his time and attention-
which he relies upon as a source of income for the support of himself and family, or for the accumula-
tion of wealth." Wulbern v. Drake (C. C. A.), 120 Fed. 495 (1903), aff'g In re Drake, 114 Fed.
229 (1902).
Z6Act of 9 & 10 George V (1919), c. 36, sec. 8 (1).
2 7Stephens v. Merchants' Nat. Bank (C. C. A.), 154 Fed. 341 (1907).
2 8 1n re Hoy (D. C.), 137 Fed. 175 (1905); Olive v. Armour & Co. (C. C. A.), 167 Fed.
517 (1909).
2 9Couts v. Townsend (D. C.), 126 Fed. 249 (1913).
3OHarris v. Tapp (D. C.), 235 Fed. 918 (1916).
3 lKing v. Ohio Valley Trust Co. (C. C. A.). 286 Fed. 928.
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store,3 2 or maintained a greenhouse,3 3 or had a financial interest in various manu-
facturing concerns.3 4 On the other hand, a doctor-farmer who kept regular office
hours was deemed to be chiefly engaged in the practice of medicine.83
Especially troublesome was the case of the so-called "retired farmer". Courts
generally regarded such a person as being subject to an involuntary petition in
bankruptcy, 36 even though he continued to live on the farm, 7 leasing it under
a "share-cropper" arrangement,38 and doing occasional work thereon during em-
ployment scarcity.39 Yet one who retired from his farm and went to live in town,
leasing the farm to another under an agreement to assist on the farm when able,
was held to be chiefly engaged in farming.40 The courts were not in harmony
even on the question of the necessity of one's having any occupation at all.
41
Where a farmer conveyed to his wife the title to his farm and thereafter contin-
ued to operate the farm as his own, the wife merely performing the usual duties of a
farmer's wife, it was held that she could properly be adjudicated an involuntary
bankrupt. 42 Yet a farmer's widow, on whom title to the land devolved and whose
son operated the farm with the understanding that she was to share in the pro-
fits, was held to be engaged chiefly in farming, whether she continued to reside
on the farm 43 or lived elsewhere.
44
PARTNERSHIPS AND CORPORATIONS AS FARMERS
Only natural persons were included in the farming exemption. Therefore,
while one who operated a farm for a corporation was exempt from involuntary
32 Wulbern v. Drake (C. C. A.), 120 Fed. 493 (1903), aff'g In re Drake (D. C.), 114 Fed. 229
(1902); Rise v. Bordner (D. C.), 140 Fed. 566 (1905); Sutherland Medicine Co. v. Rich & Bailey
(D. C.), 22 Am. B. R. 85 (1909) ; Am. Agr. Chem. Co. v. Brinkley (C.C.A.), 194 Fed. 411 (1912).
3 3
1n re Terry (D. C.). 208 Fed. 162 (1913).
9
4
Counts v. Columbus Buggy Co. (C. C. A.), 210 Fed. 748 (1913); Powers v. Silberman
(C. C. A.), 3 F. (2d) 802 (1925). But see In re Brown (D. C.), 284 Fed. 899 (1922).
85Gillcey v. National Alumni (C. C. A.), 288 Fed. 196 (1923). Similarly as to one whose
puincipal business was the operation of a cannery. In re Maclem (D. C.), 22 F. (2d) 426 (1927).
36
1n re Leland (D. C.), 185 Fed. 830 (1910).
3 7
1n re Matson (D. C.), 123 Fed. 743 (1903).
38
1n re Glass (C. C.A.), 53 F. (2d) 844 (1931).
39
1n re Driver (D. C.), 252 Fed. 956 (1918).
40
1n re Glick (C. C. A.), 26 F. (2d) 398 (1928). To the same effect, see In re Tyler (D. C.)
284 Fed. 152 (1922).
4 1
"For the purpose of determining whether a person is subject to an involuntary petition, one
must have some vocation." In re Brais (C. C. A,), 15 F. (2d) 693, at 694 (1926),
"The evidence shows quite conclusively that appellant, after he ceased work as a bookkeeper and
until the acts of bankruptcy were committed, was not actively engaged in ary occupation." Swift
v. Mobley (C. C. A.), 28F. (2d) 610 (1928).
42
1n re Johnson (D. C.), 149 Fed. 864 (1907).
431n re Brais (C. C. A.), 15 F. (2d) 693 (1926).
441n re Cox (D. C.), 9 F. Supp. 244 (1935).
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bankruptcy,"1 the corporation itself did not possess this immunity, even though
it was chiefly engaged in farming." A partnership, on the other hand, if similar-
ly engaged, was not subject to involuntary proceedings,' 7 nor were the individual
members thereof. 48 In fact, if one partner in a firm was engaged chiefly in farm-
ing, the partnership being mainly occupied along other lines, such partner could
not be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt in his individual capacity.' 9 This, how-
ever, did not prevent the firm from being so adjudged. 50 And where a partner-
ship entity was adjudicated an involuntary bankrupt, it was held that the court
might seize and administer the property of a partner, although, as an individual.
lie was exempt because chiefly engaged in farming. 51
BURDEN OF PROOF AND DATE OF STATUS
Courts were in agreement at least as to the burden of proof. Not only was
the petitioning creditor required to carry the primary burden of showing that the
respondent was not within the exempt class, 52 but the petition was demurrable if
it failed to indicate the debtor's chief occupation. 53 If, however, notwithstanding
the petition's defect in this respect, the respondent moved to dismiss the petition
on the ground that he was chiefly engaged in farming, his answer was deemed
a waiver of the petitioner's failure to make the proper allegation. 5' And having
made out a prima facie case, the petitioner freed himself of the duty of continuing
with proof, and the burden shifted to the debtor to show his exemption. 5 It was
held, too, that the defense was not personal to the debtor, but might be raised by a
creditor as well.5 6
Although some courts ruled that a person's occupation should be determined
as of the date when he incurred the indebtedness on which the involuntary petition
45Evans v. Florida Nat. Bk. (C. C. A.). 38 F. (2d) 627 (1930), reversing 28 F. (2d) 67
(1928). Cert. denied, 281 U. S. 762 (1930).
46In re Lake Jackson Sugar Co. (D. C.), 11 Am. B. R. 458 (1904).
4 ?Sutherland Medicine Co. v. Rich & Bailey (D. C.), 22 Am. B. R. 85 (1909) ; Still's Sons
v. Am. Nat. Bk. (C. C. A.), 209 Fed. 749 (1913); In re Beiseker & Martin (D. C.), 277 Fed.
1010 (1921).
48In re Terry (D. C.), 208 Fed. 162 (1913).
49In re Duke & Son (D. C.), 28 Am. B. R. 195 (1912).
5OIn re Disney (D. C.), 219 Fed. 294 (1915).
51Dickas v. Barnes (C. C. A.), 140 Fed. 849 (1905).
521n re Beisker & Martin (D. C.), 227 Fed. 1010 (1921); In re Brais (C. C. A.), 15 F. (2d)
693 (1926) ; In re Maclem (D. C.), 22 F. (2d) 426 (1927); In re Cox (D. C.), 9 F. Supp. 244
(1935).
631n re Taylor (C. C. A.), 102 Fed. 728 (1900) ; Rise v. Bordner (D. C.), 140 Fed. 566 (1905).
54Smith v. Brownsville State Bk. (C. C. A.), 15 F. (2d) 792 (1926).
55In re Leland (D. C.), 185 Fed. 830 (1910); In re Driver (D, C.), 252 Fed. 956 (1918).
561n re Taylor (C. C. A.), 102 Fed. 728 (1900), Instance, In re Sutter (D. C.), 270 Fed.
248 (1920).
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was based,67 the more generally accepted doctrine fixed his status as of the time
the alleged act of bankruptcy was committed.58 On principle, the minority rule
should have been applied only where the debtor changed from a non-exempt oc-
cupation to an exempt one for the express purpose of defrauding his creditors.59
AMENDMENT OF 1933
The years 1933, 1934, and 1935 saw Congress double the contents of the
Bankruptcy Act with amendments designed to aid and relieve debtors by way of
compositions, extensions, adjustments, and reorganizations. Among the added
sections is 75,60 providing for agricultural compositions and extensions. The
benefits of this section extend only to "farmers". The framers of this amendment
sought to obviate some of the problems which the courts had encountered in deal-
ing with the exemption of persons engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of
the soil. Accordingly, they supplied a statutory definition of a farmer. This read
as follows:
.'For the purpose of this section [75] and section 74, the term 'farmer'
means any individual who is personally engaged primarily in farm-
ing operations or the principal part of whose income is derived from
farming operations, and includes the personal representative of a
deceased farmer . . .61
If Congress thought that this definition would be free from ambiguity, the
confidence was badly m;placed. The courts still had the problem of deciding
whether the word "farming", as here used, included more than tillage of the soil.
Answering this question in the negative, one court decided that a person engaged
primarily in raising sheep was not a farmer.62 In constrast, it was held in another
jurisdiction that one who derived all his income from raising chickens was a farmer
within the definition quoted,"A
Use of the term "primarily" instead of "chiefly", and "farming operations"
instead of "farming or the tillage of the soil", may have been intended to help
67
1n re Burgin (D. C.), 173 Fed. 726 (1909). Cf. also In re Crenshaw (D. C.), 156 Fed.
638 (1907); In re Wakefield (D. C.), 182 Fed. 247 (1910); Tiffany v. La Plume Co. (D. C.),
141 Fed. 444 (1905).
68 !n re Mackey (D. C.), 110 Fed. 355 (1901); Olive v. Armour & Co. (C.C.A.), 167 Fed.
517 (1909) ; In re Disney (D. C.), 219 Fed. 294 (1915) ; In re Inman (D. C.), 57 F. (2d) 595
(1932).
59 Harris v. Tapp (D. C.), 235 Fed. 918 (1916).
6011 U. S. C. A. 203.
61Bankruptcy Act, sec. 75r. Act of Mar. 3, 1933.
62In re Palma (D. C.), 8 F. Supp. 920 (1934).
63 In re Wilkinson (D. C.), 10 F. Supp. 100 (1935). So also as to one who operated a fruit
orchard. In re Plumer (D. C.), 9 F. Supp. 923 (1935).
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the courts. If so, the purpose was not accomplished, for some judges held,64 and
others denied,65 that decisions under the wording of section 4b were controlling
in the interpretation of the amendment.
The addition of the disjunctive clause, "or the principal part of whose income
is derived from farming operations", only served to create more confusion in the
minds of the courts. In a case construing the effect of these words the court ruled
that the use of the correlative "or" did not destroy the necessity of the petitioner's
being primarily engaged in farming. Thus, a person who derived most of his in-
conic from the operation of a citrus farm, but who lived in town and spent most of
his time in practicing dentistry, was held not to be a farmer.66 The decision appears
to be directly opposed to the express wording of the definition.
Good faith became another test of a person's right to call himself a farmer
under section 75. He was required not only to be primarily engaged in farming
operations, but also to be so operating bona fide and in person. The framers of
the amendment doubtless injected the element of good faith to prevent the
possible practice of changing occupations simply to take advantage of the
special benefits offered by section 75. In the exercise of general equitable powers,
a court of bankruptcy probably already had implied authority to frustrate such an
attempt. At any rate, under this provision it has been held that if A owns prop-
erty worth more than the mortgages on certain of his farms, and conveys his
encumbered farms to B, who owns no other realty and no farm implements, B
is not a bona fide farmer. 67
The word "individual", as used in the definition, may have been meant to
include a partnership,6" but certainly not a corporation. The word "income", re-
ferred, of course, to gross income, rather than net income.6 9 And by "farming
operations" was meant the production of raw foods or other material by natural
processes of growth.7
0
64"'The court is of the opinion that there is little distinction between the phrase 'chiefly engaged
in farming', and that of 'personally . . . .engaged primarily in farming,' or that of 'the principal
part of whose income is derived from farming operations.' Consequently, the reasoning of the courts
in interpreting the language used in the original act is persuasive." In re Day (D. C.), 10 F. Supp.
229, at 231 (1935). In the case of In re Palma Bros. (D. C.), 8 F. Supp. 920 (1934), construing
the definition, the court cited as authority cases decided under section 4b.
65Jn the case of In re Wilkinson (D. C.), 10 F. Supp. 100 (1935), the court said: "It is not
necessary to be governed by the decisions made under section 4."
661n re Hilliker (D. C.), 9 F. Supp. 948 (1935). The court says, p. 950. "If in the definition
of a 'farmer' the lawmakers had stopped when they declared that a 'farmer' was one who is 'personally
bona fide engaged primarily in farming operations', the courts would have little difficulty in the
matter of interpretation. The additional words, separated by the disjunctive 'or' inject cause for de-
bate."
67 1n re Fullager (D. C.), 8 F. Supp. 602 (1934).
68That a partnership was included was assumed, but not specifically decided, in the case of
In re Palma Bros. (D. C.), 8 F. Supp. 920 (1934).
69 1n re Knight (D. C.), 9 F. Supp. 502 (1934).
70obid.
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Under this definition of a farmer,"1 as well as under the former wording
of section 4b,72 the territorial extent of a person's farming operations played a
decisive role in determining whether he was engaged in farming. Thus, a mere
truck gardner was held not to be engaged in farming."3 Just where the line was
to be drawn never clearly appeared.
THE FARMER IS REDEFINED
By virtue of the Act of May 15, 1935,74 there is now complete uniformity
in the definition of those who are exempt from involuntary bankruptcy under
section 4b and those who may take the benefits of section 75. Section 4h, now pro-
vides:
"Any natural person, except a wage-earner or a farmer may be an
involuntary bankrupt .......
And section 75r now provides:
"For the purposes of this section (75), section 4b, and section 74,
the term 'farmer' includes not only an individual who is primarily
bona fide personally engaged in producing products of the soil,
but also any individual who is primarily bona fide personally engaged
in dairy farming, the production of live stock, or the production
of poultry products or live stock products in their unmanufactured
state, or the principal part of whose income is derived from any one
or more of the foregoing operations, and includes the personal repre-
sentatve of aP dereasprd farmer
This definition not only helps to make the Act harmonious within itself, but
removes all previous doubt as to the status of those who raise live stock and
poultry. Most of the old questions, however, still remain to be solved. Courts will
continue to be bothered by the terms "personally", "primarily", "bona fide", and
"individual". And by all means a more satisfactory explanation must be made as
to the effect of the word "or", in the clause beginning, "or the principal part of
whose income is derived . . . ". Since Congress has made a fresh start, it is to be
hoped that the courts will follow suit.
J. Wesley Oler
12n re Weis (D. C.), 10 F. Supp. 227 (1935).
72
1n re Spengler (D. C.), 238 Fed. 862 "(1916); Swift v. Mobley (C. C. A.), 28 F. (2d)
610 (1928).
73In re McMurray (D. C.), 8 F. Supp. 449 (1934); In re Weis (D. C.), 10 F. Supp. 227
(1935); In re Spengler (D. .), 238 Fed. 862 (1916).
74C. 114, sec. 1-3, 49 Stat. 246.
